We present a PT AS for learning random constant-depth networks.

We show that computing even very coarse approximations of critical points is intractable for simple classes of nonconvex functions. More concretely, we prove that if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a polynomial in $n$ variables of constant degree (as low as three) and outputs a point whose gradient has Euclidean norm at most $2^n$ whenever the polynomial has a critical point, then P=NP. The algorithm is permitted to return an arbitrary point when no critical point exists. We also prove hardness results for approximate computation of critical points under additional structural assumptions, including settings in which existence and uniqueness of a critical point are guaranteed, the function is lower bounded, and approximation is measured in terms of distance to a critical point. Overall, our results stand in contrast to the commonly-held belief that, in nonconvex optimization, approximate computation of critical points is a tractable task.

We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of generalized equilibrium which allows for asymmetric regret constraints, and yields polytopes of feasible values for each agent and pair of regret constraints, where we show that any such equilibrium is reachable by a pair of algorithms which maintain their regret guarantees against arbitrary opponents. As a central example, we highlight the case one agent is no-swap and the other's regret is unconstrained. We show that this captures an extension of Stackelberg equilibria with a matching optimal value, and that there exists a wide class of games where a player can significantly increase their utility by deviating from a no-swap-regret algorithm against a no-swap learner (in fact, almost any game without pure Nash equilibria is of this form). Additionally, we make use of generalized equilibria to consider tradeoffs in terms of the opponent's algorithm choice. We give a tight characterization for the maximal reward obtainable against some no-regret learner, yet we also show a class of games in which this is bounded away from the value obtainable against the class of common mean-based no-regret algorithms. Finally, we consider the question of learning reward-optimal strategies via repeated play with a no-regret agent when the game is initially unknown. Again we show tradeoffs depending on the opponent's learning algorithm: the Stackelberg strategy is learnable in exponential time with any no-regret agent (and in polynomial time with any no-adaptive-regret agent) for any game where it is learnable via queries, and there are games where it is learnable in polynomial time against any no-swap-regret agent but requires exponential time against a mean-based no-regret agent.

We study the problem of inverting a deep generative model with ReLU activations. Inversion corresponds to finding a latent code vector that explains observed measurements as much as possible. In most prior works this is performed by attempting to solve a non-convex optimization problem involving the generator. In this paper we obtain several novel theoretical results for the inversion problem. We show that for the realizable case, single layer inversion can be performed exactly in polynomial time, by solving a linear program.

Constrained Markov game is a fundamental problem that covers many applications, where multiple players compete with each other under behavioral constraints. The existing literature has proved the existence of Nash equilibrium for constrained Markov games, which turns out to be PPAD-complete and cannot be computed in polynomial time. In this work, we propose a surrogate notion of correlated equilibrium (CE) for constrained Markov games that can be computed in polynomial time, and study its fundamental properties. We show that the modification structure of CE of constrained Markov games is fundamentally different from that of unconstrained Markov games. Moreover, we prove that the corresponding Lagrangian function has zero duality gap. Based on this result, we develop the first primal-dual algorithm that provably converges to CE of constrained Markov games. In particular, we prove that both the duality gap and the constraint violation of the output policy converge at the rate $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}})$. Moreover, when adopting the V-learning algorithm as the subroutine in the primal update, our algorithm achieves an approximate CE with $\epsilon$ duality gap with the sample complexity $\mathcal{O}(H^9|\mathcal{S}||\mathcal{A}|^{2} \epsilon^{-4})$.

Many inference problems in structured prediction can be modeled as maximizing a score function on a space of labels, where graphs are a natural representation to decompose the total score into a sum of unary (nodes) and pairwise (edges) scores. Given a generative model with an undirected connected graph G and true vector of binary labels $\bar{y}$, it has been previously shown that when G has good expansion properties, such as complete graphs or d-regular expanders, one can exactly recover $\bar{y}$ (with high probability and in polynomial time) from a single noisy observation of each edge and node. We analyze the previously studied generative model by Globerson et al. (2015) under a notion of statistical parity. That is, given a fair binary node labeling, we ask the question whether it is possible to recover the fair assignment, with high probability and in polynomial time, from single edge and node observations. We find that, in contrast to the known trade-offs between fairness and model performance, the addition of the fairness constraint improves the probability of exact recovery. We effectively explain this phenomenon and empirically show how graphs with poor expansion properties, such as grids, are now capable of achieving exact recovery. Finally, as a byproduct of our analysis, we provide a tighter minimum-eigenvalue bound than that which can be derived from Weyl's inequality.

We revisit the problem of learning from untrusted batches introduced by Qiao and Valiant [QV17]. Recently, Jain and Orlitsky [JO19] gave a simple semidefinite programming approach based on the cut-norm that achieves essentially information-theoretically optimal error in polynomial time. Concurrently, Chen et al. [CLM19] considered a variant of the problem where μ is assumed to be structured, e.g.

The leading approach to the simplex method, a widely used technique for balancing complex logistical constraints, can't get any better. In 1939, upon arriving late to his statistics course at UC Berkeley, George Dantzig--a first-year graduate student--copied two problems off the blackboard, thinking they were a homework assignment. He found the homework "harder to do than usual," he would later recount, and apologized to the professor for taking some extra days to complete it. A few weeks later, his professor told him that he had solved two famous open problems in statistics. Dantzig's work would provide the basis for his doctoral dissertation and, decades later, inspiration for the film .